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“The emergency order temporarily banning short selling of financial stocks will 
restore equilibrium to markets” (Christopher Cox, SEC Chairman, 19 September 
2008, SEC News Release 2008-211). 
“Knowing what we know now, I believe on balance the commission would not do 
it again. The costs (of the short-selling ban on financials) appear to outweigh the 
benefits.” (Christopher Cox, telephone interview to Reuters, 31 December 2008).  
 
Most stock exchange regulators around the world reacted to the financial crisis of 2007-09 by 
imposing bans or constraints on short sales. These hurried interventions, which varied 
considerably in intensity, scope and duration, were presented as measures to restore the 
orderly functioning of securities markets and limit unwarranted drops in securities prices, 
capable of exacerbating the crisis. The SEC News Release 2008-211 that announced the short 
sales ban on U.S. financial stocks summarizes the regulators’ view during the crisis: 
“unbridled short selling is contributing to the recent sudden price declines in the securities of 
financial institutions unrelated to true price valuation.”    
However, theoretical reasons and previous evidence cast doubt on the benefits of short-
selling bans, suggesting instead that they may reduce market liquidity and hinder price 
discovery, while not necessarily supporting security prices. These concerns are particularly 
relevant in the context of the crisis: if short-selling bans did contribute to the decrease in 
stock market liquidity in 2008-09, they would have inflicted serious damage on market 
participants who sorely needed liquidity and could hardly obtain it on fixed income markets. 
At least as importantly, it is worth asking whether short-selling bans met the regulator’s 
stated objective of stabilizing stock prices in the midst of the crisis. 
In this paper we exploit the regulatory interventions around the world in 2008-09 to 
illuminate these issues: the flurry of short-selling bans generated an unprecedented wealth of 
data that can be used to investigate their effects on market liquidity, on the speed of price 
discovery and on stock prices. Short-sale restrictions were imposed and lifted at different 
dates in different countries; they often applied to different sets of stocks (only financials in 
some countries, all stocks in others) and featured different degrees of stringency. All these 
features make the data ideally suited to identify the effects of the bans through panel data and 
event study techniques. Moreover, compared to individual countries data, multi-country   2
evidence should be less affected by the confounding effects arising from other country-
specific policy interventions that occurred during the crisis period. 
Our sample consists of daily data for 16,491 stocks in 30 countries, from January 2008 to 
June 2009. For each country, we ascertain if and when a short-selling ban was enacted in this 
period, and if so which stocks it applied to, and which restrictions it imposed on short sales. 
The primary focus of our study is the effect of short-selling bans on market liquidity, but we 
also investigate their effects on other dimensions of market performance considered in the 
literature, such as price discovery and the level of stock prices.  
In assessing the impact of short-selling bans on liquidity, we take into account that bid-
ask spreads may be affected by stock-specific characteristics: hence in the estimation we use 
stock-level fixed effects, and in some specifications also control for return volatility, whose 
changes may affect bid-ask spreads by changing the inventory risk of market makers, and for 
common changes in liquidity by including day fixed effects, to take into account 
commonality in liquidity. The latter is especially important in view of the fact that during the 
crisis increased uncertainty and acute funding problems are likely to have reduced stock 
market liquidity throughout the world.  
Our results indicate that the short-selling bans imposed during the crisis are associated 
with a statistically and economically significant liquidity disruption that is, with an increase 
in bid-ask spreads and in the Amihud illiquidity indicator, controlling for other variables. 
Instead, the obligation to disclose short sales is associated with a significant improvement in 
market liquidity. 
We also investigate whether these negative effects on liquidity disproportionately affect 
stocks with some characteristics, and find that that they are more pronounced for small-cap 
stocks. As a result, in countries where such stocks are overrepresented the bans are associated 
with larger increases in bid-ask spreads. Moreover, the adverse liquidity effect of bans is 
stronger for stocks that do not have listed options than for stocks that do, suggesting that the 
availability of an option market allows investors to effectively express short views on the 
underlying stock affected by the ban. For the dually listed stocks in our sample, short-selling 
bans in the home market increase bid-ask spreads both on the home and on the foreign 
market, while foreign bans only reduce liquidity within the foreign market.   3
The evidence also shows that short-selling bans slow down price discovery, especially 
when negative news are concerned, in line with theoretical predictions and with previous 
empirical findings. Finally, the bans are not associated with better stock price performance, 
the U.S. being the only exception: we find that bans are not significantly correlated with 
excess returns in countries with short-selling bans on financials, except in the U.S. where the 
correlation is positive and significant, in line with the results by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang 
(2009). However, this result for the U.S. may reflect concomitant announcements of bank 
bail-outs, and thus may be spurious. Therefore, in contrast to the regulators’ hopes, the 
overall evidence indicates that short-selling bans have at best left stock prices unaffected, and 
at worst may have contributed to their decline. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section I briefly reviews the relevant literature in 
order to develop the testable hypotheses. Section II presents the data and methodology. 
Section III reports descriptive evidence and regression analysis about the impact of short-
selling restrictions on market liquidity, and investigates whether it differs across stocks with 
different characteristics. Sections IV and V present the results about the impact of short-
selling restrictions on price discovery and on stock prices, respectively.  Section VI 
concludes.  
 
I. The setting 
Our analysis concerns the effects of short-selling bans on three variables: market liquidity, 
price discovery and stock overpricing. As a starting point, we consider which effects are 
predicted by the theory for each variable, and give a brief account of the evidence so far.  
 
A. Liquidity 
The effects of short-selling bans on liquidity are in principle ambiguous. Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1987) analyze their effects in a variant of the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model 
and show that, by preventing informed investors to trade on bad news, short-selling bans 
reduce the speed of price discovery, and such delayed resolution of uncertainty about 
fundamentals tends to increase the bid-ask spread.    4
However, this result only applies if the ban equally constrains informed and uninformed 
investors. If instead potential short-sellers have superior information (consistently with 
intuition and with much evidence), a short-selling ban lowers the fraction of informed traders 
on the sell side. On this account the ban would tend to reduce the bid-ask spread, for given 
information revealed by past trades. But since the ban also slows the revelation of such 
information, the overall effect on the bid-ask spread is ambiguous.  
In a setting where bid-ask spreads compensate dealers for their inventory holding costs, 
instead, a short-selling ban should widen bid-ask spreads: the inability to short the stock 
should impair market makers’ inventory management, which is especially problematic in 
volatile market phases such as the crisis period. And even if market makers retain access to 
short-selling, the ban limits competition by other liquidity suppliers, thereby allowing market 
makers to widen their spreads. Moreover, by sidelining investors with negative information, 
short-sale constraints make prices less informative and thus increase the risk to uninformed 
market participants (Bai, Chang and Wang, 2006). So if market makers are uninformed, they 
will widen their bid-ask quotes to cover their increased inventory holding costs.  
Most of the evidence available so far is consistent with the idea that short-selling bans 
damage liquidity. The evidence most directly related to the present study is provided by 
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009), who analyze with panel data techniques the response of 
liquidity to the short-selling ban imposed from September 18 to October 8 in the United 
States, exploiting the difference between the financial stocks targeted by the ban and those 
that were not. They find that liquidity – as measured by spreads and price impacts – 
deteriorated significantly for stocks subject to the ban. This finding is confirmed by 
Kolasinski, Reed and Thornock (2010), who find that the June 2008 emergency order that 
already restricted naked short selling for 19 stocks had a similar adverse effect on liquidity. 
Also Marsh and Payne (2011), who analyze order and transaction-level data for the U.K., 
find that as soon as the ban applied to financial stocks, their bid-ask spreads widened and 
their market depth declined much more than for exempt non-financial stocks, even though 
before the ban the prices and order flows of the two groups of stocks had behaved similarly.  
However, other studies report more ambiguous or even conflicting evidence. Jones and 
Lamont (2002) investigate how liquidity responded to changes in the stringency of short-sale   5
constraints during the Great Depression in the U.S., and find that the 1932 requirement that 
brokers secure written authorization before lending a customer’s shares reduced liquidity, but 
the 1938 requirement that short selling be executed only on an up tick increased liquidity. 
Charoenrook and Daouk (2005), who investigate the effects of market-wide short-sale 
restrictions on several variables for 111 countries, find that short-sale restrictions correlate 
with greater market-wide liquidity, as measured by total stock market trading volume.  
While most of these studies are based on U.S. data, our contribution analyzes how 
liquidity reacted to short selling bans in 30 countries, exploiting cross-country variation in 
the bans’ enactment and lifting dates, in their stringency and in their coverage in order to 
identify their effects and filter out the effect of other concomitant country-specific events or 
policies. Our study also differs from Charoenrook and Daouk (2005), because we rely on 
individual stock data rather than market indices, and measure liquidity with bid-ask spreads 
and the Amihud illiquidity index rather than with trading volume, notoriously a problematic 
proxy for liquidity.
1 This is particularly true of the crisis period, when increases in bid-ask 
spreads have often been associated with greater trading volumes. 
 
B. Speed of price discovery 
The predicted effect of short-selling bans on the speed of price discovery is more clear-cut 
than that on liquidity, as should be clear from the above discussion of the Diamond-
Verrecchia (1987) model: by preventing traders from short selling, a ban moderates the 
trading activity of informed traders who have negative information about fundamentals and 
thereby slows down price discovery, and does so asymmetrically – more in bear than in bull 
markets. Indeed this is precisely what regulators hope to achieve with short-selling bans: 
preventing bad news from being rapidly impounded in stock prices, probably in the belief 
that such bad news are “unwarranted”, in the sense that they reflect a negative bubble or 
herding behavior rather than fundamental information. 
Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) investigate whether short sales restrictions affect the 
speed of price discovery, using data on short-sale restrictions for 46 equity markets around 
                                                 
1 Since our data are at daily frequency, we cannot compute other measures of liquidity, such as effective or 
realized spreads and estimates of price impact, which require intraday data.   6
the world. They find that prices incorporate negative information faster in countries where 
short sales are allowed and practiced, implying that short-selling bans are associated with less 
efficient price discovery at the individual security level. These findings accord with the 
evidence by Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010) and by Boehmer and Wu (2010) that the ability to 
short sell stocks increases the informational efficiency of market prices. They are also 
consistent with the result by Reed (2007) that short-selling bans determine an asymmetry in 
price adjustment in response to earnings announcements.  
In apparent contrast with the evidence from these studies, Kolasinksi, Reed and Thornock 
(2009) report that during the 2008 ban period in the U.S. the negative relation between short-
selling volume and stock returns grew stronger, so that short-selling activity became more 
informative. But the contradiction is only apparent: in the presence of a partial short-selling 
ban, banned stocks may feature slower price discovery (in the sense that their own order flow 
becomes less informative), yet their price may become more sensitive to the short sales that 
investors are allowed to carry out on other stocks – especially if the ban is accompanied by 
increased disclosure of short sales, as indeed was the case in the U.S. during the crisis.
2 
Also on this score our contribution is to bring panel data to bear on the issue: while Bris, 
Goetzmann and Zhu (2007) rely on cross-country variation in their data, we exploit time-
series variation due to inception and lifting dates of bans, sometimes differentially across 
stock classes, to identify the bans’ effect on price discovery. In fact, we completely remove 
purely cross-sectional variation from our sample, as we include stock-level fixed effects. 
 
C. Overpricing 
Miller (1977) predicts that short-selling constraints lead to “overpricing”, namely, to prices 
above the equilibrium level that would prevail without such constraints. This prediction is 
based on the idea that, if investors have heterogeneous beliefs, prohibiting short-selling will 
lead to stock prices that reflect only the valuations of bullish investors and those of bearish 
investors who currently own the stock. Bearish investors who do not own the stock are 
                                                 
2 The U.S. short-selling ban on financials was imposed on Friday 19 September 2008, and the obligation to 
disclose short sales on a weekly basis became effective on the subsequent trading day (Monday 22 September) 
and applied to all stocks, for trades exceeding 0.25 percent of the relevant company’s capital.   7
excluded from trading, so that their valuations do not affect the price. Hence, prices should 
rise above their full-information values when a ban is imposed, and decline when it is lifted.  
This mechanical prediction of Miller’s model does not survive in the rational 
expectations framework of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), where market participants adjust 
their valuations to take into account that short-selling constraints sideline investors with 
negative information, so that in equilibrium stocks are not systematically overpriced when 
short-sales are banned.  
However, the no-overpricing result of Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) hinges not only 
on the assumption of rational expectations but also on investors’ risk-neutrality. Bai, Chang 
and Wang (2006) show that when rational investors are risk-averse, the slower price 
discovery induced by short-sales constraints increases the risk perceived by uninformed 
investors and leads them to require higher expected returns; hence it induces lower prices, 
contrary to Miller’s prediction. But they also show that with risk-averse investors a 
countervailing effect may also be at work: a ban on short sales also prevents investors from 
taking on negative positions to hedge other risks. This effect pushes up the demand for the 
stock and tends to increase its price. 
Thus, with risk-averse investors the net effect of a short-selling ban on stock prices is 
ambiguous, and is more likely to be negative the greater the slowdown in price discovery 
induced by the ban. The prediction that a short-selling ban may aggravate a decline in prices, 
rather than prevent it, is also present in the model by Hong and Stein (2003), where the 
accumulated unrevealed negative information of investors who would have engaged in short 
sales surfaces only when the market begins to drop, thereby aggravating the price decline. 
So the predictions of the theory regarding the effect of short sales on stock prices are 
ambiguous. Unfortunately, the evidence available so far is equally mixed. Bris, Goetzmann 
and Zhu (2007) report cross-country evidence that short sale constraints are significantly 
associated with less negative skewness for market returns, but not for individual stock 
returns. Evidence consistent with the overpricing hypothesis is reported by Jones and Lamont 
(2002), using data about shorting costs in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) from 1926 
to 1933, and by Chang, Cheng and Yu (2007), who rely on data from the Hong Kong stock 
market. But in contrast to these findings, research on the suspension or removal of short-sale   8
price-tests such as the uptick rule in the U.S. finds no significant stock price effects 
(Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008, and Diether, Lee and Werner, 2009).  
Recent studies of U.S. evidence about the 2008 short-selling ban on financials have 
produced equally controversial evidence on the overpricing effect. Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang (2009) document large price increases for banned stocks upon announcement of the 
ban, followed by gradual decreases during the ban period. Yet they recognize that the 
correlation with the ban could be spurious, as the prices of U.S. financials could have been 
affected by concomitant announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Their 
skepticism is reinforced by the finding that stocks that were later added to the ban list 
experienced no positive share price effects. However, Harris, Namvar and Phillips (2009) try 
to control for the concomitant bank bail-out announcements, by estimating a factor model of 
stock price changes that includes among the factors the return of an index of the banned 
stocks and a TARP index. Their estimates imply that banned stocks earned positive abnormal 
returns during the ban period, but these abnormal returns persisted after the lifting of the ban.  
Reliance on data from the U.S. – where the inception of short-selling ban on financials 
coincided with bank bailout announcements – makes it hard to identify the price effects of 
the ban. International evidence can be particularly valuable in this respect, since in several 
other countries short-selling bans were not accompanied by bailout announcements, or at 
least such announcements were not concomitant with the bans. Moreover, in many countries 
bans also applied to non-financial stocks, which were not affected by bank bailout 
announcements, and in other countries financial stocks were not banned. As we shall see, by 
relying on cross-country as well as time-series variation in the inception and lifting of bans, 
we find that the overpricing effect apparently present in U.S. data is absent elsewhere. 
 
 
II. Data and Method 
Our data consist of daily stock bid and ask prices, volumes, short-selling bans characteristics, 
inception dates and lifting dates for 17,040 stocks from 30 countries (most European markets 
and developed non-European markets), for the period spanning from January 1
st, 2008 to 
June 23
rd, 2009. Data for bid and ask prices, volumes and number of outstanding shares are   9
drawn from Datastream. Bid and ask prices are measured at the market close. Our initial data 
set contains 5,992,679 stock/day observations.
3 We winsorize the data by eliminating the 
observations corresponding to the top 1 percent of bid-ask spread (thereby eliminating values 
exceeding 54.9 percent), as well as those corresponding to negative bid-ask spreads. The 
missing bid-ask prices for four countries and the application of the filters leave us with a 
sample of 5,143,173 stock/day observations and 16,491 stocks. The dates and characteristics 
of short-selling regimes are obtained from the web sites of national regulatory bodies and of 
the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). In particular, this information 
allows us to distinguish between “naked” and “covered” bans: the former forbid naked short 
sales, i.e. transactions in which the seller does not borrow the stock to deliver it to the buyer 
within the standard settlement period, while the latter also forbid covered short sales, i.e. 
transactions where the seller manages to borrow the stock.
4 
Table I describes the structure of our data set. As a fraction of the total observations, 12.4 
percent refer to stocks affected by a short-selling ban. As of the 1
st of October 2008 (when 
most bans were operative), 31.5 percent of the stocks in the sample were affected by a ban on 
short sales (whether naked or covered). However, the fraction varies considerably from 
country to country, from zero in, say, Austria and Denmark to 100 percent in Australia and 
Japan. Table I also shows that in many countries short-selling bans were accompanied by 
disclosure requirements, whereby existing short positions in financials or, for some countries, 
in all stocks, must be disclosed if they represent a significant fraction of existing shares 
(generally 0.25 percent). In some countries this information is reported to the national 
regulatory body, while in others it is disseminated to all market participants. 
Figures 1 and 2 visually document the extent of the cross-country variation in short-
selling regimes between September 2008 and June 2009. Figure 1 shows the period in which 
bans were enacted in the countries of our sample via color-coded lines. Dark and light blue 
lines correspond to naked bans of financial and non-financial stocks, respectively. Red lines 
indicate covered bans for financial stocks, while orange lines correspond to covered bans of 
                                                 
3 Bid and ask prices are available for the stocks from all the countries in the sample except for the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel and Luxembourg. However, for these countries we can still compute the 
Amihud illiquidity ratio. 
4 See Gruenewald, Wagner and Weber (2010) for a description of the different types of short-selling restrictions 
and for a discussion of their possible rationale.   10
non-financial stocks. The figure visually conveys the variety of regimes and of their duration 
across countries, as well as the complex regime variation over time, even within the same 
country (the extreme example here being Italy). 
Figure 2 gives a more synthetic illustration of the diffusion of short-selling bans across 
the world during the crisis, by plotting the fraction of banned stocks in our sample, separately 
for naked and covered bans. The two darker histograms show the weight of banned stocks in 
total market capitalization, while the lighter histograms show them as a fraction of the total 
number of stocks in our sample at the corresponding date. The overall fraction of banned 
stocks jumped from 0 to about 20 percent in September 2008, rose again to over 30 percent 
in October, and then gradually decreased back to 20 percent in the subsequent 8 months. 
Interestingly, in September and October 2008 covered bans were more widespread than 
naked ones, while their relative importance tended to reverse later on. As of June 2009 about 
20 percent of the stocks in our sample were still subject to naked bans, whereas covered bans 
had almost disappeared. 
A key feature of our data, which emerges clearly from Table I and from Figures 1 and 2, 
is that the regulation of short sales during the crisis differed across countries along many 
dimensions: 
(i)  different ban inception dates (e.g., Spain intervened after the U.S.); 
(ii)  different lifting dates (e.g., the U.S. and Canada were the first countries to lift the bans); 
(iii)  the presence of countries that imposed no bans (e.g., some Scandinavian countries); 
(iv)  differences in the scope of bans, which applied only to financials in some countries 
(e.g., the U.S. and most European countries) and to all stocks in others (e.g., Australia, 
Japan, South Korea and Spain); 
(v)  differences in the stringency of bans, which were naked in some cases, and covered in 
others. 
Interestingly, the regulatory response of the U.S. differed from that of all the other 
countries in terms of timing, since they were the first to impose and to lift the ban, and also in 
terms of stringency, as they imposed a covered ban from the start. Moreover, the SEC banned 
short sales only on financials, while several other countries banned them for all stocks and   11
others did not ban them at all. Thus, our data contain much additional information beyond the 
U.S. data on which most existing studies of short sale restrictions are based.    
The hallmark of our estimation method is precisely to exploit this international variation 
in short-sale regimes in order to identify the effect of short-selling bans (i) on liquidity, as 
measured by the quoted percentage bid-ask spread and the Amihud illiquidity ratio; (ii) on 
the speed of price discovery, as captured by the extent to which individual stock returns 
correlate with past market returns instead of contemporaneous ones; and (iii) on the 
overpricing of stocks, as measured by the excess returns on stocks subject to bans relative to 
those on exempt stocks. 
In our regression analysis, we measure short sales restrictions by two dichotomic 
variables, corresponding to different degrees of severity – the milder one being the ban on 
naked short sales (Naked Ban), and the stricter one being the ban on covered short sales as 
well (Covered Ban). The Naked Ban variable equals 1 when only naked short sales are 
forbidden (covered ones being allowed), while the Covered Ban variable equals 1 when 
covered short sales are also forbidden. Therefore, the effect of Naked Ban is identified by the 
observations for which the ban does not extend to covered short sales. We also have a third 
dichotomic variable (Disclosure), which equals 1 when short sellers are required to disclose 
their trades and 0 otherwise. 
All our regressions include fixed stock-level effects to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity due to liquidity-related characteristics: stock characteristics, such as risk, 
number of market makers, analyst coverage, capitalization and size of public float; and 
country characteristics, such as insider trading regulation and enforcement. Since models of 
the bid-ask spread based on adverse selection and inventory holding risk suggest that risk is a 
potentially important determinant of bid-ask spread, in some specifications we also control 
for the changing stock-level volatility of returns. 
In some regressions we use our entire sample, including observations from countries that 
imposed no ban or that imposed bans on all stocks, so that the control group is formed by 
stocks in countries that imposed no bans and exempt stocks in countries that imposed partials 
bans. These regressions fully exploit the identification arising from the cross-country 
diversity in ban regimes, but the estimated coefficient on the ban variables may reflect   12
changes in the country-level behavior of bid-ask spreads. To perform a sharper “diff-in-diff” 
estimation, in other regressions we restrict the estimation to countries that imposed bans only 
on financial stocks, like the U.S.: while this has the drawback of leaving only financials in 
the treated group and only non-financials in the control group, it allows us to include time 
fixed effects and crisis-related control variables to take into account the commonality in 
liquidity or returns, especially important at a time when the whole world experienced 
increases in uncertainty and in funding problems. 
Beside panel data estimation, we also use an event study methodology to test for the 
effect of short-selling bans over a time window of 50 days before and 50 days after the ban 
inception date. We apply this method only to the data of countries that imposed partial bans, 
where for each stock subject to a ban we identify a matching exempt stock with the same 
option listing status, with a criterion based on market capitalization and initial stock price 
explained in Section III. Compared to panel data estimation, this method has the advantage of 
focusing on a time interval where the effects of the ban should be less easily clouded by 
confounding factors, at the cost of neglecting a considerable amount of information. 
 
 
III. Market Liquidity 
We examine the effects of short-selling bans on liquidity in two steps. We start with simple 
descriptive evidence about the pattern of quoted bid-ask spreads before, during and after the 
bans, and then provide evidence based on regression analysis. 
 
A. Descriptive Evidence 
Figure 3 shows that during the crisis bid-ask spreads increased worldwide, and their peaks 
coincided with the salient moments of the crisis: the sudden collapse and distress sale on 
March 16 of Bear Stearns to JPMorgan Chase in March 2008, the failure of IndyMac Bank 
on July 11, the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15 and the AIG rescue 
announcement on September 16, the rejection by the U.S. Congress of the initial version of 
the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act on September 29 (followed by its approval on 
October 3), and the Citibank rescue announcement on November 23.    13
Short-selling bans were introduced in the wake of the dreadful news about the state of 
U.S. banks in September 2008: as shown by Table I, in most countries the inception date of 
the bans was in the second half of September. The ban was then lifted at different dates in 
Australia, Canada, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the U.K. and the U.S., while 
in the other countries it was retained until the end of our sample (June 2009). Figure 3 
indicates that, while bid-ask spreads are higher when most countries banned short sales, their 
time pattern is also associated with financial turmoil per se: for instance, average bid-ask 
spreads started increasing in early September, when no country had banned short sales yet.  
However, the descriptive statistics reported in Table II suggest that short selling bans 
further contributed to the deterioration in liquidity, as illustrated also by additional figures 
reported in the Internet Appendix of this paper. Columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table II document that 
stocks affected by a short-selling ban feature a significantly larger median bid-ask spread 
during the ban period. The difference is statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level 
for all the countries, based on the Wilcoxon test for the difference between the median in the 
ban period and the median in the pre-ban and (where available) the post-ban period. Columns 
4 and 5 show that the median bid-ask spread during the ban period is on average 2.27 times 
as large as its pre-ban value, and over 3 times as large for Canada, Ireland, Italy, the U.K. and 
the U.S. In the five countries that lifted the ban during our sample period (Australia, Canada, 
the Netherlands, U.K. and U.S.) the bid-ask spread during the ban was on average 1.5 times 
as large as its post-ban value. 
Admittedly, the period in which short-selling bans were imposed was especially 
turbulent, so that bid-ask spreads at that time may have been abnormally high even for stocks 
not targeted by bans. This is confirmed by the statistics in columns 6, 7 and 8 of Table II: 
median bid-ask spreads were significantly higher also for stocks unaffected by short-selling 
bans, in all the countries of our sample. But the corresponding statistics for the stocks 
affected by the ban are even higher, as can be seen by comparing the figures in column 4 
with those of column 9 of the table. For instance, the median bid-ask spread for U.S. stocks 
affected by the ban increased by 243 percent (column 4), whereas for exempt stocks it only 
increased by 54 percent (column 9). Of course, this comparison can only be performed where 
the ban did not apply to all stocks, namely in the countries shown in the lower part of the   14
table. The econometric methods used in the next section will specifically rely on the different 
responses of banned and non-banned stocks to identify the effect of the short selling bans. 
 
B. Regression Analysis: Overall Liquidity Effect 
We turn to regression analysis to investigate whether the correlation between bid-ask spreads 
and short-selling bans persists when one controls for different types of bans, for stock 
characteristics and for time-varying stock-level and aggregate factors. Table III presents 
estimates of regressions where the dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask 
spread, and short sales restrictions are measured by the three dummy variables described in 
Section II: Naked Ban, Covered Ban, and Disclosure.
5 More specifically, columns 1 to 6 
show panel regression estimates with stock-level fixed effects, while column 7 presents 
estimates of event study regressions with fixed effects for matched pairs of stocks. 
B.1. Panel Regressions 
The estimates in columns 1 show that the ban on naked short sales is associated with an 
increase of 1.28 percentage points in the bid-ask spread, and the more stringent ban on 
covered short sales with an increase of 1.98 percentage points. These are large effects 
compared with the 4.05 percent average bid-ask spread in our sample,
6 and both coefficients 
are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, their huge t-statistics reflecting our 
very large sample size. The bid-ask spread turns out to be instead negatively correlated with 
the obligation to disclose short sales: its coefficient – also very precisely estimated – 
indicates that short-selling disclosure is associated with a reduction of 0.65 percentage points 
in the spread. This suggests that disclosure may reduce adverse selection problems in the 
market, because short sellers – feeling under the scrutiny of market authorities and other 
                                                 
5 The effect of short-selling bans on bid-ask spread may be spuriously inflated by the minimum tick size. A 
drastic drop in stock prices, such as the one induced by the crisis, may cause the percentage spread to increase 
mechanically, because the absolute spread cannot fall below the minimum tick size. This could bias the 
estimates of the coefficients of the ban variables, since short-selling bans were introduced precisely at the time 
of sharply falling prices. However, we find that the distribution of absolute bid-ask spreads does not show any 
clustering of observations at the lowest boundary, except for Australia (where 5 percent of the observations 
cluster at an absolute bid-ask spread of 1/10 of 1 cent) and Hong Kong (where no short-selling ban was 
imposed). If we remove Australia from the sample, all our results remain qualitatively unaffected. 
6 This large average bid-ask spread reflects the positive skew of our sample, arising from a tail of very illiquid 
small stocks. Indeed the median is considerably lower (1.24 percent).   15
market participants – trade less aggressively on their negative information. The specification 
of column 1 is estimated with OLS, stock-level fixed effects, and robust standard errors 
clustered at the stock level.  
In column 2 the regression is re-estimated on the subset of financial stocks only, using the 
same specification and estimation method as in column 1. We can still identify the effects of 
the short-selling bans, because the ban on financial stocks was enacted at different times in 
different countries and, in some countries, financial stocks were not subject to any short-
selling constraint. This regression allows us to check whether the results shown in column 1 
do not simply reflect a liquidity differential between financial and non-financial stocks, 
considering that the ban applied mainly to financial stocks during the crisis. The estimates in 
column 2 show that, even within the subset of financial stocks, short-selling bans are 
associated with a larger bid-ask spread. Indeed, the coefficient of the covered ban dummy 
estimated on the subsample of financial stocks is not statistically different from that obtained 
in the overall sample; instead, the coefficient of the naked ban dummy is significantly 
smaller for the subsample of financial stocks. 
Since the bid-ask spread is typically autocorrelated, in column 3 we re-estimate the 
specification of column 1 with an AR(1) correction for the error term. Compared to the 
estimates in column 1, the coefficients of the three variables of interest are smaller in 
absolute value but remain sizeable and significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
Column 4 shows the estimates of an expanded specification that includes volatility (measured 
as the rolling standard deviation of returns based on the previous 20 trading days) among the 
explanatory variables.
7 The coefficients of the three ban variables are virtually the same as in 
column 3, and the coefficient of volatility is positive, consistently with the idea that increases 
in risk should be associated with larger bid-ask spreads. Again, all estimates are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level. 
Very similar results are also obtained if the specifications in columns 1 through 4 of 
Table III are estimated using the Amihud illiquidity measure (defined as the ratio of the 
absolute value of daily return to trading volume) instead of the bid-ask spread as the 
                                                 
7 We also experiment with volatilities estimated on longer rolling horizons of 40 and 60 trading days. All the 
results are virtually unchanged.   16
dependent variable. By using the Amihud illiquidity measure, we can exploit data for all 30 
countries listed in Table I, instead of the 25 countries for which the bid-ask spread is 
available. Also in these regressions (whose estimates are reported in the Internet Appendix to 
save space), the coefficients of the Naked and Covered Ban variables are positive, the 
coefficient of Disclosure is negative, and all three are significantly different from zero at the 
1 percent level. Again, the results are almost identical if the estimation is restricted to 
financial stocks only, and the results are robust to the introduction of volatility among the 
explanatory variables. 
The sample used in the first four columns of Table III includes countries that banned 
short-sales on all stocks (where there is no benchmark group of exempt domestic stocks) and 
countries that imposed no bans. Hence, the estimated coefficient on the ban variables may be 
affected by changing differentials between country-level bid-ask spreads. To overcome this 
concern and perform a sharper “diff-in-diff” estimation, in columns 5 to 7 of Table III we 
restrict the estimation to the subset of 12 countries that applied short-selling bans only to 
financial stocks, so that in each country non-financial stocks perform the role of controls.  
Comparing the estimates in column 5 with their counterparts in columns 4 shows that in 
this smaller sample a short-selling ban is associated with a considerably larger increase of the 
bid-ask spread, and disclosure with a much larger decrease. (The same conclusion holds with 
the AR(1) correction.) In other words, the better identification strategy allowed by selective 
bans leads to stronger estimated effects than in the larger sample. 
In this subsample where bans apply only to some stocks in each country, one can also 
control for market-wide developments related to the financial crisis by adding day dummies 
to the list of the explanatory variables.
8 To ease the burdensome computational task of 
estimating firm fixed effects and day effects all at once, we first de-mean all the variables at 
the stock level and then perform a panel regression with day fixed effects. The resulting 
estimates of the short-selling variables’ coefficients shown in column 6 of Table III are 
considerably smaller than those obtained in column 5 (from 2.43 to 0.23 for the Naked Ban, 
from 2.75 to 0.46 for the Covered Ban, and from 1.79 to 0.50 for the Disclosure dummy), 
                                                 
8 In contrast, in the subsample of countries where short-selling bans applied to all stocks, the ban dummies are 
perfectly collinear with calendar dummies.   17
but their signs and statistical significance remain the same. The estimate of the constant is 
close to zero, because this panel regression is estimated on zero-mean variables. 
B.2. Event Study Regressions 
A possible concern is that in the panel regression estimates shown in columns 1 to 6 the 
impact of short-selling bans may be clouded by the inclusion of observations that are far 
away from the inception date of the bans. To address this concern, in column 7 we show the 
estimates obtained from an event study with a 50-day window before and after the ban 
inception date, again only for countries with partial bans. 
To perform this regression, we match each stock subject to the ban with the exempt stock 
traded in the same country and with the same option listing status that is closest in terms of 
market capitalization and stock price (the distance criterion being the sum of the squared 
percentage differences in market capitalization and in the stock price at the beginning of the 
sample period), as done by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009). To provide a check on the 
quality of the control sample, in Figure 4 we plot the average bid-ask spreads of the banned 
stocks and their matching stocks during our event window, as well as that of their 
differential: the figure shows that the average bid-ask spreads of two samples are very similar 
before the ban inception and diverge precisely after the ban date.
9 
The estimates from the event study regression shown in column 7 of Table III, which 
includes fixed effects for each pair of matched stock and day effects, are broadly consistent 
with those obtained in the panel data regressions, except for a stronger estimated impact of 
short-selling bans: the coefficients of the ban variables are roughly twice as large as those 
obtained from the panel estimation of the same specification shown in column 6 (which also 
includes day fixed effects), and are estimated with similar precision. Instead, the coefficient 
of the disclosure variable is almost identical in size, though less precisely estimated.
 10 
                                                 
9 In the Internet Appendix, we report the average and median spreads by country for stocks subject to the bans 
and for control stocks both before and during the ban, and perform statistical tests of differences in medians 
both before and after the ban, as well as tests of difference-of-difference of pairs. The results show that the 
difference-of-difference in liquidity is significantly different from zero for all countries except Ireland.   
10 We also explore the robustness of these findings to the possibility that our matching criterion may generate 
some “bad matches” between stocks. We experiment with three simple screens. First, we exclude the pairs of 
matched stocks in the top 1 percent of the distance measure for each country: the results do not change. Second, 
to be more conservative, we exclude the pairs in the top 25 percent of the distance measure for each country: the   18
B.3. Endogeneity 
Yet another concern about the estimates reported in Table III arises from the possible 
endogeneity of short-selling bans: if policy makers tend to impose them at times in which 
stocks tend to become illiquid for some other reason, the correlation between short-selling 
bans and market illiquidity documented so far could not be interpreted as a causal 
relationship. To face this concern, we estimate an instrumental variables (IV) regression 
where the first stage is a linear probability model determining the likelihood of a ban and the 
second stage models its effects on liquidity. Our international panel data allows us to attack 
this identification problem, which would be unsolvable with a single-country data set.  
As usual in these cases, the key requirement is identification of suitable instruments, that 
is, variables to be included only in the first stage that are correlated with the decision to 
impose a short-selling ban but not with the residuals of the bid-ask spread regression. In this 
choice, one must take into account that the decision to impose a short-sale ban is a decision 
taken at the market-wide level, rather than a decision tailored to individual stocks. Therefore, 
the instruments must be market-wide variables, and must vary over time to avoid perfect 
collinearity with the stock-level fixed effects.  
We identify two candidate instruments: the lagged values of the country-level credit 
default swap (CDS) spreads for financial stocks and of the financial stress index proposed by 
Balakrishnan, Danninger, Elekdag and Tytell (2009). The country average CDS spread of 
financial institutions is a market-based and timely assessment of insolvency risk in the 
financial sector, and we expect countries where this risk is greater to be more inclined to 
impose protective regulations such as short selling bans on financials. The financial stress 
index has a similar logic, but focuses more on the systematic risk borne by financial 
institutions in each country, as it extracts information mainly from stock returns. Again, we 
expect countries where banks are more exposed to systematic risk to be more likely to 
impose short-selling restrictions. Indeed, both variables turn out to have strong explanatory 
power in the first-stage regression. At the same time, being lagged, these two variables 
should not be correlated with liquidity at the individual stock level if the effect of an increase 
                                                                                                                                                         
results again do not change. Finally, we exclude from the sample all observations for the countries with largest 
mean distance, since in these countries an accurate matching is harder to achieve: our findings are, if anything, 
even stronger than in the full sample. We report the results of these additional checks in the Internet Appendix.   19
in default risk is fully impounded in contemporaneous bid-ask spreads: indeed, the 
instruments clearly pass the Sargan exogeneity test.  
When these two variables are used as instruments in an IV panel regression with day and 
stock-level fixed effects, the coefficient of the ban variable is found again to be positive and 
significant: even accounting for their endogeneity, short-selling bans are associated with 
greater illiquidity. The estimated coefficient of the ban dummy (0.31) is comprised between 
those of the two ban dummies in column 6 of Table III, as one would expect, considering that 
in the IV regression we use a single ban dummy for both naked and covered bans. To 
preserve space, the IV estimates are reported in the Internet Appendix. 
B.4. Distinguishing between Ban Inceptions and Ban Lifts 
The specifications estimated in Table III impose the implicit restriction that the impact of 
short-selling bans on market liquidity is exactly reversed when these bans are lifted, that is, 
they constrain ban inceptions and ban lifts to have effects of the same magnitude and 
opposite sign. However, this constraint can be dropped by estimating a specification where 
bid-ask spreads are regressed on two different dummy variables for ban inceptions and lifts: 
the first equals 1 for the duration of the ban and 0 otherwise, exactly as the ban dummies 
used in Table III; the second dummy, instead, equals 1 after the ban is lifted and 0 otherwise. 
This specification can be estimated only for bans of covered short sales, because no naked 
bans were lifted in our sample period.
11   
In Table IV we show the results obtained by estimating this specification with two 
alternative methods. In column 1, we estimate a panel OLS regression for the six countries 
that imposed a covered ban on financial stocks only (with non-financials in the same 
countries as control stocks), including stock-level fixed effects. In columns 2 and 3, instead, 
we adopt an event study method, using matched stocks for countries that lifted covered bans 
on financial stocks within our sample period (Canada, Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.), using 
the stock matching method described in Section III.B.2. The estimation period is a time-
window of 50 days before and after the ban inception in column 2, and a time-window of the 
                                                 
11 In our sample period, we only observe two countries partially lifting their bans on naked short selling of non-
financial stocks, leaving in place the naked ban on financials.    20
same length around the ban lift date in column 3: this is done so as to obtain comparable 
estimates of the effect of the ban enactment and of its lift for these four countries. Both 
regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors, including matched-stock pairs 
and day fixed effects.  
The results obtained with both methods show that the enactment of the ban is associated 
with a statistically significant increase in bid-ask spreads, and the ban lift with an equally 
significant decrease in bid-ask spreads, which provides further evidence that short-selling 
bans were responsible for a deterioration of market liquidity. More specifically, in the panel 
regression shown in column 1, the coefficient of the ban enactment (0.17) exceeds that of the 
ban lift (0.10) in absolute value, the difference between their absolute magnitudes being 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In the event study regressions reported in 
columns 2 and 3, both estimated effects are larger than in the panel regression of column 1, 
and the coefficient of the ban enactment (0.61) is smaller than that of the ban lift (0.90) in 
absolute value, although the difference between their absolute magnitudes is not statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels.
12 
 
C. Regression Analysis: Differential Liquidity Effects 
The previous section documents that the short-selling bans imposed during the financial 
crisis hampered stock market liquidity, while short-sales disclosure requirements had the 
opposite effect. It is then natural to ask whether these effects were homogeneous across 
stocks or affected disproportionately stocks with some specific characteristics. To answer this 
question, in this section we investigate whether short-selling restrictions have affected 
differently (i) small-cap and riskier stocks (Section III.C.1); (ii) stocks with listed options 
(Section III.C.2); (iii) stocks listed in specific countries (Section III.C.3); and (iv) 
domestically or foreign listed stocks, when a cross-listing is present (Section III.C.4). 
                                                 
12 The regression results reported in Table IV are consistent with those obtained from country-by-country 
difference-of difference tests between median bid-ask spreads for stocks subject to bans and control stocks 
during the ban period and once the ban is lifted. These tests, reported in the Internet Appendix, show that 
liquidity improves significantly after the lift of the ban in three out of the four countries that we examine 
(Canada, UK. and U.S.).   21
Apart from being of independent interest for policy makers, investors and issuers, 
investigating whether the liquidity effects of short-selling bans differs across stocks provides 
a further test of our identification strategy. For instance, consider the differential impact of 
short-selling restrictions on stocks with and without listed options. If the availability of an 
option market allows traders to take short positions on the underlying stock, it should weaken 
the effect of short-selling restrictions on market liquidity. Therefore, finding a larger liquidity 
effect for non-optionable stocks than for optionable ones would confirm that the liquidity 
effects documented in the previous section actually arise from short-selling restrictions.  
C.1. Size and Volatility 
We start by investigating whether short-selling restrictions have different effects for stocks 
with different market capitalization and different return volatility. It is well known that, even 
in the absence of short-selling constraints, market makers are more reluctant to provide 
liquidity for small-cap and riskier stocks than for other stocks (see Glosten and Harris (1988), 
Hasbrouck (1991) and Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002), among others). This reluctance 
is likely to be compounded when market makers are unable to short stocks, and therefore 
must carry larger inventories to perform their role. In such circumstances, if faced with the 
choice of which stocks to stop (or reduce) trading, market makers should be more likely to 
withdraw from smaller and riskier ones. 
The estimates in Table V are consistent with this prediction. In columns 1 and 2, the 
regression is estimated separately for the top and bottom quartiles of the companies by 
capitalization, where the quartiles are computed separately for each country and the 
capitalization is measured as the average of total market value in the first half of 2008. The 
coefficient of the ban dummies is about 30 to 40 percent larger for smaller stocks, the 
difference being significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level. Qualitatively similar 
results (not shown in the table) obtain if the regression is estimated separately for the stocks 
above and below the median capitalization in each country, as well as in an expanded 
specification where the ban dummy variable is entered both in level and multiplicatively with 
the corresponding company’s percentile in its country’s distribution of stock capitalization in 
the first half of 2008. The estimates of this expanded specification imply that the ban had   22
almost no effect on the stocks in the top percentile of the size distribution, while for those in 
the bottom percentile its effect was about twice as large as for the median stock. 
A similar picture emerges when the estimation is performed separately for low and high 
volatility stocks, where volatility is measured using stock returns in the first six months of 
2008. Columns 3 and 4 of Table V show that the coefficient of the ban dummy is about 10 
percent larger for stocks in the top volatility quartile that in those in the bottom quartile. The 
difference between the ban coefficients in the two sub-samples is not statistically significant, 
but if one uses a single ban dummy variable for both naked and covered bans, the coefficient 
of the ban variable for high-volatility stocks is statistically larger than for low-volatility ones.  
C.2. Optionable Stocks 
During short-selling bans, investors could still effectively take short positions by trading in 
the option markets, because ban regulations did not impose any direct restriction in derivative 
markets. Battalio and Schultz (2011) document that the ratio of option-to-stock volume for 
U.S. markets is comparable for banned and control stocks throughout the pre-ban and ban 
period. While this evidence suggests that investors did not seem to migrate to the option 
market to gain short exposure in financial stocks, it also indicates that for stocks with listed 
options investors could use option markets to gain short exposure during the short sale ban.  
In order to investigate if the bans’ liquidity effects differ in the two cases, we classify 
stocks into those that have traded options and those that do not: we obtain a record of all 
stocks with traded options for all the countries in our sample, using information from 
national option exchanges, and for most countries we are able to cross-check the list of stocks 
with the availability of equity option prices in Datastream. 
As stated in the introduction to this section, we expect the effects of short-selling 
restrictions on bid-ask spreads to be stronger for stocks without a listed option than for those 
with it.
13 The results are presented in columns 5 and 6 of Table V. As expected, we find a 
strikingly stronger effect of short-selling bans on liquidity for stocks without listed options. 
                                                 
13 The stocks with listed options in our sample tend to have relatively large capitalization and volatile returns, 
consistently with Mayhew and Mihov (2004) who show that exchanges tend to list options on stocks with high 
volatility and market capitalization. Based on the evidence of the previous subsections, these two characteristics 
should affect in opposite directions the effect of short sale bans on the liquidity of optionable stocks.     23
For countries that imposed a naked ban, the average percentage bid-ask spread increase is 
more than four times larger for stocks that do not have listed options. The economic impact is 
similar for countries that imposed a covered ban: the effect for stocks with no listed options 
is three times larger than for stocks with listed options. These differences are statistically 
different at the 1 percent level. 
As explained above, these results are important not only because they suggest that the 
presence of derivative markets mitigated the adverse effects of short-selling bans on 
liquidity, but also because they provide further evidence that the reduction in liquidity that 
we document is indeed related to the ban enactment. 
C.3. Country of Listing 
It is also worth exploring whether the effect of the short-selling bans on liquidity is present in 
all the countries in our sample, and whether it differs appreciably among them. This is done 
in Table VI, where we relax the implicit constraint of the panel analysis that the coefficients 
of the explanatory variables be the same across countries.
14 This is equivalent to estimating 
the regression separately for each country, while retaining stock-level fixed effects. The 
results indicate that even when unconstrained, the slope coefficients of the short-selling 
restrictions are estimated to be positive and significant for almost all countries.
15 
The individual country coefficient estimates are displayed in Figure 5, separately for the 
Naked and the Covered Ban variables. Italy emerges as the country where the ban on short 
sales was associated with the most dramatic deterioration of market liquidity, followed by 
Denmark, Australia and Norway.  The U.S., U.K. and Ireland are in an intermediate group, 
while in the remaining countries short-selling bans have been associated with comparatively 
mild increases in bid-ask spreads – in the order of about 50 basis points or less.
16  
                                                 
14 The specification is the same as in column 1 of Table III except for the exclusion of the Disclosure variable, 
which was excluded because it is perfectly collinear with the Naked or Covered Ban variable (except for 
Portugal, where disclosure was required for all stocks whereas the naked ban is on financials only, and for 
Hungary, which imposed disclosure but no ban). 
15 The only country for which the Naked Ban on financial stocks is not significant is the Netherlands (p-value = 
0.14). But in that country, the naked ban lasted only two weeks before being converted into a covered ban. 
16 These differences between country-specific coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.   24
These large cross-country differences in the impact of short-selling bans partly reflect the 
different characteristics of national stock markets: in cross-country regressions reported in 
the Internet Appendix, we explore whether the estimates of the ban coefficients in the 
country-by-country regressions correlate with the median stock size (as measured by market 
capitalization), median return volatility and ownership concentration of the respective stock 
markets. The inclusion of size and volatility is warranted by the results of Table V, which 
suggest that the effect of short-selling bans should be stronger in countries with a larger 
fraction of small-cap and volatile stocks. We also include the concentration of stock 
ownership, because stocks with more concentrated ownership feature less floating shares, 
and therefore lower liquidity; hence we expect the effect of short-selling bans to be more 
dramatic in such countries. The results are consistent with these priors, even though the 
estimates are not very precise, probably due to the paucity of observations: the ban 
coefficients are larger in the countries whose listed companies have smaller capitalization, 
more volatile returns and more concentrated ownership, that is, in the markets where 
liquidity is more of an issue even in the absence of short-selling bans.
17   
C.4.  Cross-Listed Stocks 
Finally, it is interesting to consider how short-selling bans affected dually listed stocks, 
which were sometimes subject to a short-selling ban only in one of the two countries of 
listing: in this case, we need to control for the effects of two ban regimes, the domestic and 
the foreign one. The issue is whether the two regimes had the same effects on the respective 
market liquidity, and whether short-selling restrictions have cross-border spillover effects. 
We concentrate on the 126 non-U.S. stocks listed both on NYSE or NASDAQ and on a 
non-U.S. market. When such stocks were subject to a short-selling ban, in 82 percent of the 
cases the ban applied both to the domestic and to the U.S. market; for most of the remaining 
dually listed stocks, instead, the ban was enacted only domestically. 
Table VII shows that a domestic ban worsens liquidity not only in the home market but 
also on the foreign one; in contrast, a ban in the foreign market worsens liquidity only within 
                                                 
17 Other country and market characteristics, such as the quality of legal enforcement and the fraction of 
optionable stocks, turn out to have no explanatory power in these cross-country regressions for the differential 
effects of short-selling bans.   25
that market. So when a ban is imposed at home, its effects spill over abroad, while the 
opposite is not true. These results suggest that the domestic market is the key one for the 
provision of liquidity both at home and in the U.S. market, in line with its dominant role in 
trading activity highlighted by Halling, Pagano, Randl and Zechner (2008).  
 
 
IV. Price Discovery 
As highlighted in Section I, while the effect of a short-selling ban on bid-ask spreads is in 
principle ambiguous, its effect on the speed of price discovery is unambiguously predicted to 
be negative. By restraining trading by investors with negative fundamental information, a 
short-selling ban should slow down price discovery, and more so in bear market phases. 
To test this prediction on our data, we estimate a market model regression, regressing 
weekly returns for each stock in our sample on the corresponding broad national stock 
market index from January 2008 to June 2009. The choice of the weekly frequency is 
motivated by similar approaches in the literature (e.g., Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu, 2007) that 
find this horizon to strike an optimal balance between noise and information. The analysis is 
carried out on residuals, on the assumption that the ban should slow down the discovery of 
firm-specific rather than market-wide information. If the data are consistent with the 
predictions of the theory, the autocorrelations should be significantly higher during the ban 
period, especially for negative returns.  
Column 1 of Table VIII shows the median autocorrelation of residuals for two sub-
samples: (i) stocks exempt from bans and non-exempt stocks in periods when no ban was 
imposed (Ban = 0) and (ii) non-exempt stocks during the ban period (Ban = 1).  Importantly, 
this sample breakdown does not have a perfect correlation with time, because different 
countries imposed bans at different points in time, and some imposed partial bans or did not 
impose any ban at all. The figures in column 1 show that the autocorrelation of residuals is 
positive in both subsamples, but is larger for stocks subject to short-selling bans. Since the 
distribution of the autocorrelation statistic is not normal, we test for the difference between 
the two samples using two non-parametric tests for the equality of medians: the K test and the 
two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test (not shown in the table). According to   26
both, the difference is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This finding is consistent 
with a lower speed of price discovery during the ban period. 
We verify the robustness of this evidence using an alternative approach based on a 
variance ratio test, performed separately for stocks subject and not subject to a short selling 
ban. We find that the hypothesis that stocks returns are approximated by a random walk 
cannot be rejected in 53 percent of the cases for non-banned stocks, but only in 39 percent of 
the cases for banned stocks, the difference being statistically different from zero at the 1 
percent level. These findings confirm previous evidence that information is revealed more 
slowly when stocks are subject to a short-selling ban.
18 
Since short-selling bans are intended to limit the activity of investors with bearish views, 
they should slow price discovery more in overall declining markets than in rising ones. To 
gauge whether such asymmetric effect is present in the data, we perform a test proposed by 
Bris, Goetzmann and Zhu (2007): we compute cross-autocorrelations between individual 
stock returns and market returns lagged by one week, separately for negative lagged market 
returns and for positive ones. More precisely, we calculate a “downside cross-
autocorrelation”  1 (, ) ict mct corr r r
  and an “upside cross-autocorrelation” 1 (, ) ict mct corr r r
  for 
each stock i in country c (where  1 mct r
  and  1 mct r
  are negative and positive observations on 
market returns, respectively) and then compute the median values of these two sets of stock-
level statistics. The results, respectively shown in columns 2 and 3, indicate that (i) both the 
median upside and downside cross-autocorrelations are positive and significantly larger 
during ban periods, (ii) the median downside cross-autocorrelation exceeds the upside one, 
and most importantly (iii) the difference between the two is significantly larger when short 
sales are banned. More specifically, in column 4 we show the median difference between 
downside and upside cross-autocorrelation in each of the two subsamples, and in the bottom 
cell we report the median difference of the differences. This evidence indicates again that not 
only short-selling bans slow down price discovery, but do so especially during overall market 
declines, consistently with theoretical predictions. 
 
                                                 
18 The consistency between the analysis based on autocorrelations and the one based on variance ratio tests is in 
line with the latter being approximately a linear combination of the autocorrelation coefficient estimators of the 
first differences with arithmetically declining weights.    27
 
V. Stock Prices 
The main reason why regulators impose short-selling bans is that they expect them to help 
stem financial panics. The bans imposed during the 2007-09 financial crisis were no 
exception in this respect. In terms of Miller’s (1977) model, stock market regulators may 
have regarded the bans as needed to prevent “underpricing” of stocks: they probably feared 
that, with optimistic investors largely neutralized by funding constraints, unbridled short-
sales would have triggered an unwarranted collapse in share prices.
19 Indeed, Brunnermeier 
and Oehmke (2008) argue that such intervention may be temporarily justified for the stocks 
of financial institutions, when these are become vulnerable to predatory short selling: 
aggressive short-selling may cause such institutions to violate their regulatory capital 
constraints and force them to liquidate long-term investments at fire-sale prices. In this 
section, we examine whether the bans provided effective support for the prices of financial 
stocks, when benchmarked against exempt stocks. 
The most immediate evidence is obtained by focusing on the countries where the ban did 
not apply universally, and comparing the post-ban median cumulative excess returns for 
stocks subject to bans with those of exempt stocks, where excess returns are defined as the 
difference between individual stock returns and the respective country equally-weighted 
market indices. This “visual diff-in-diff” evidence is presented in Figures 6 and 7, separately 
for the U.S. and for other countries that imposed bans only on financial stocks.  
The reason for plotting excess returns separately for the U.S. and for other countries is 
that in the U.S. the effect of the ban on financial stock prices may be clouded by the 
concomitant TARP announcement, precisely aimed at supporting U.S. financial institutions, 
a confounding factor not present in other countries that banned short sales on financials. 
Indeed, returns appear to have behaved quite differently in the U.S. and elsewhere during 
short-selling ban periods. Figure 6 shows that the median cumulative excess return of U.S. 
financial stocks, which were subject to a covered ban, exceeded that of exempt stocks 
throughout the 14 trading days after the ban inception (date 0 in the figure), a finding that 
                                                 
19 Shkilko, Van Ness and Van Ness (2011) document that short sales may increase downward pressure on prices 
even in the absence of negative information: they study large negative price reversals on no-news days and find 
that short selling during these reversals substantially amplifies price declines.   28
agrees with that reported by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009) for the U.S. market. But 
Figure 7 shows that this did not occur in other countries: the line corresponding to the median 
excess return on stocks subject to naked and covered bans is very close to that for exempt 
stocks, and it lies above it only in about half of the first 60 days of trading after the inception 
of the ban. Since – as noted above – the positive effect shown in Figure 6 for the U.S. may 
result from the TARP announcement rather than from the ban itself, Figure 7 is likely to 
convey a more accurate picture of the bans’ effects on stock returns.  
To go beyond the visual scrutiny of these figures, in Table IX we regress weekly excess 
returns on the Naked Ban, Covered Ban and Disclosure dummies, plus stock-level fixed 
effects to control for the risk characteristics of individual stocks. The regressions in columns 
1 and 2 refer to the U.S. alone, while those in column 3 and 4 to all other countries that 
imposed short-selling bans only on financial stocks. As in Figures 6 and 7, excess returns are 
defined as differences between raw returns and the respective equally-weighted market 
indices. We drop observations for which the raw weekly return is zero, to avoid biases 
arising from stale prices due to non-trading. 
In Table IX, we use two different approaches to identify the effect of short sales 
restrictions. In columns 1 and 3, we report standard panel estimates where the control group 
is formed by all the stocks that were not subject to bans, respectively for the U.S. and for 
other countries with partial bans.
20 Instead, the estimates in columns 2 and 4 are obtained 
using an event-study methodology – again respectively for the U.S. and for other countries 
with partial bans – with a 50-day window before and after the ban inception date. As in the 
liquidity regressions shown in column 7 of Table III, each stock subject to the ban is matched 
with the exempt stock traded in the same country and with the same option listing status that 
is closest in terms of market capitalization and stock price.
21 
The estimates in Table IX confirm the visual evidence drawn from the figures. The U.S. 
stock market response to short-selling bans is positive and significant, whether we consider 
                                                 
20 In the Internet Appendix we report the average and median excess returns by country for stocks subject to the 
bans and for control stocks both before and during the ban, and perform statistical tests of differences in 
medians both before and after the ban, as well as tests of difference-of-difference of pairs. The results show that 
difference-of-difference of returns are statistically significant (and positive) only for the U.S., Canada and 
Denmark, and marginally significant (but negative) for Belgium. 
21 This matching algorithm yields similar stock returns for banned and control stocks before the ban inception 
date: their difference before this date is not statistically different from zero (the t-statistic being 0.17 for U.S. 
stocks,  0.15 for non-U.S. stocks and 0.16 for the pooled sample).    29
the panel estimates in column 1 or the event study estimates in column 2. Instead, for other 
countries with partial bans, the coefficients of the ban variables are not significantly different 
from zero in the panel data estimates of column 3. The corresponding estimates obtained 
with the event study methodology are shown in column 4: the covered ban coefficient is 
again not significantly different from zero, and the naked ban’s coefficient is negative and 
significant.
 22 Therefore, in countries other than the U.S., short-selling bans are associated 
either with no significant change or with a decline in stock returns (consistently with the 
predictions by Bai, Chang and Wang, 2006, and Hong and Stein, 2003).
23 
Finally, we try to deal with the possible endogeneity of the ban enactment, by estimating 
an instrumental variables (IV) regression for stock returns, precisely as done for liquidity in 
Section III.B. Specifically, the first stage is a linear probability model determining the 
likelihood of a ban, while the second stage models its effects on excess returns and includes 
calendar and stock-level fixed effects. We use the same two instruments used for the ban 
dummy variable in the liquidity regression, namely the lagged values of country-level CDS 
spreads for financial stocks and of the financial stress index built by Balakrishnan, 
Danninger, Elekdag and Tytell (2009). In the IV panel regression, which is estimated on data 
for all countries with partial bans (including the U.S.), the coefficient of the ban is again not 
significantly different from zero. In this case, however, the instruments are weaker than in 
the liquidity regression, suggesting more caution in the interpretation of the IV findings.
24 To 
preserve space, the estimation results are reported in the Internet Appendix. 
                                                 
22 As for the liquidity regression in column 7 of Table III, also the results reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 
IX are robust to potential “bad matches” generated by our matching criterion. Specifically, we exclude the pairs 
of matched stocks in the top 1 percent of the distance measure for each country, then those in the top 25 percent 
of this measure, and finally we drop from the sample observations for the countries with largest mean distance.  
In all three cases, the findings in columns 2 and 4 of Table IX are qualitatively unchanged. We report the results 
of these robustness checks in the Internet Appendix. 
23 If the panel regressions are estimated by pooling U.S. and non-U.S. data, the coefficients of both ban 
variables turn out to be not significantly different from zero. Instead, if the matching methodology is applied to 
the pooled data set, the results are similar to those obtained using non-U.S. data only: the naked ban variable has 
a negative and significant coefficient, while the coefficients of the covered ban and disclosure variables are not 
significantly different from zero. We have also re-estimated the regressions in Table IX with an AR(1) 
correction, and the results are virtually unchanged. Finally, we estimated event study regressions to assess the 
impact of ban lifts, using a time-window of 50 days before and after the lift dates, and find that the ban lift is 
associated with a significant reduction in U.S. excess stock returns, but no significant change in excess stock 
returns for the pooled data of Canada, U.K. and the Netherlands. Thus also these results (which are reported in 
the Internet Appendix) are fully consistent with those shown in Table IX. 
24 The p-value for the robust Sargan test of the exogeneity of the instruments is 5 percent.   30
In conclusion, the results for the U.S. are the exception rather than the rule around the 
world – an exception that may be explained by the confounding effect of the concomitant 
TARP announcements, as argued by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009). Elsewhere, besides 
damaging market liquidity, bans on short sales appear to have failed to support market prices, 




The evidence in this paper suggests that the reaction of most stock exchange regulators 
around the globe to the financial crisis – imposing bans or regulatory constraints on short-
selling – was detrimental for market liquidity, especially for stocks with small market 
capitalization, high volatility and no listed options. Moreover, it slowed down price 
discovery, and was at best neutral in its effects on stock prices. 
The ban-induced decrease of market liquidity is especially serious because it came at a 
time when bid-ask spreads were already high as a result of the crisis and investors were 
desperately seeking liquid security markets due to the freeze of many fixed-income markets. 
Our findings on international data complement and confirm the results reported for the U.S. 
by the concurrent study carried out by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2009), and show that in 
other countries the ban’s effect were worse than in the U.S.: the implied liquidity reduction 
was larger, and in contrast with the U.S. the effect on stock returns was not significantly 
different from zero. In fact, our estimates based on the matching methodology suggest that 
the ban of naked short-sales is associated with lower returns for non-U.S. countries.  
Perhaps the main social payoff of this worldwide policy experiment has been that of 
generating a large amount of evidence about the effects of short-selling bans. The conclusion 
that this paper distils from this evidence is best summarized by the words of the former SEC 
Chairman quoted at the start of this paper: “Knowing what we know now, … [we] would not 
do it again. The costs appear to outweigh the benefits”. It is to be hoped that this lesson will 
be remembered when security markets face the next crisis.  
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Table III. Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans: Regression Analysis 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread at the market close. In the first four columns, 
we use data for 25 countries (all the countries in Table I, except for the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, 
Israel and Luxembourg). In the last three columns, we only use data for 12 countries that banned short sales 
only for financial stocks (Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, U.K. and U.S.). Naked Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are 
forbidden and covered sales are allowed and 0 otherwise. Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
even covered short sales are forbidden and 0 otherwise. Disclosure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the 
seller has to disclose his position and 0 otherwise. Volatility is a moving standard deviation of returns based 
on the previous 20 observations. The regressions are estimated by OLS on daily data with robust standard 
errors clustered at the stock level in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6, and AR(1) correction in columns 3 and 4. The 
regressions in columns 1 through 6 include fixed effects at the stock level, and that in column 7 includes fixed 
effects at the stock-pair level. The estimates in columns 1 to 6 are based on panel data, while those in column 
7 are based on matched stocks using the event study methodology described in the text. The specifications in 
columns 6 and 7 also include day fixed effects. In the regression of column 6, for computational reasons the 
estimation is implemented by replacing dependent and independent variables by their deviations from the 
respective stock-level average and including daily fixed effects in the regression. The numbers reported in 
parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. The estimates marked with three (two, one) 
asterisks are significantly different from zero at the 1 (5, 10) percent level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






































































































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
+ 
AR(1) 
Disturbances  No No Yes  Yes No No No 
Methodology Panel  Panel  Panel  Panel Panel Panel  Matching 
Number of 
Observations  5,143,173 878,279 5,126,682 5,124,349 3,188,903  3,188,903  45,588 
Included 
Stocks  All Financials All  All  All  All  All 
Number of 
Stocks (Pairs 
in Column 7) 
16,491 2,718 16,456  16,452  10,253 10,253 1,566 
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Table IV: Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans Enactments and Lifts 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread at the market close. In column 1, the 
estimates are based on the panel of daily data for the 6 countries that applied a covered ban to financial stocks 
only (Canada, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, U.K. and U.S.). The regression is estimated by OLS with robust 
standard errors, and includes stock-level and day fixed effects. For computational reasons the estimation is 
implemented replacing dependent and independent variables by their deviations from the respective stock-
level average and including daily fixed effects in the regression. In columns 2 and 3, the estimates are based 
on the event study methodology described in the text, using data for matched stocks in countries that lifted 
covered bans on financial stocks within our sample period (Canada, Netherlands, U.K. and U.S.). The 
regression in column 2 is estimated over a time-window of 50-days before and after the ban enactment date, 
and that in column 3 over a time-window of 50-days before and after the ban lift date. Both regressions are 
estimated by OLS with robust standard errors, and include fixed effects for matched-stock pairs and day fixed 
effects. Covered Ban Enactment is a dummy variable that equals 1 when covered short sales are forbidden, 
and equals 0 otherwise. Covered Ban Lift is a dummy variable that equals 1 after a covered short sale ban 
was lifted, and equals 0 otherwise. The numbers reported in parenthesis below coefficient estimates are t-
statistics. The coefficient estimates marked with three  asterisks are significantly different from zero at the 1 
percent level.  
 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) 



















Day Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Stock-Level Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Methodology  Panel  Event Study  Event Study 
Number of observations  2,702,206  41361  30728 
Number of stocks  7,092  710  710 
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Table V. Bid-Ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans: Differential Effects by Size, Volatility, and 
Stocks With and Without Listed Options 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread at the market close for 25 countries (all the 
countries in Table I, except for the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel and Luxembourg). Naked Ban is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are forbidden and covered sales are allowed and 0 
otherwise. Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if even covered short sales are forbidden and 0 
otherwise. Disclosure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the seller has to disclose his position and 0 
otherwise. Capitalization is the company’s percentile in the distribution of the capitalization of companies in 
its country, measured as the average of total market value in the first 6 months of 2008. Large-Cap (Small-
Cap) Stocks are those in the top (bottom) quartile by Capitalization in the relevant country. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of returns, measured from the beginning of January to the end of June 2008. High (Low) 
Volatility Stocks are those in the top (bottom) quartile by volatility in the relevant country. The regressions 
are estimated by OLS on daily data with robust standard errors clustered at the stock level.  All regressions 
include fixed effects at the stock level. The numbers reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates 

































































































Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
1,846,401 1,069,289 1,314,501 1,193,031  427,164  4,716,009 
Number of Stocks  6,538  3,561  4,144  4,017  1,306  15,185 
 
   39
Table VI. Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans: Country-by-Country Estimates 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread at the market close. The estimation is effected 
via a separate OLS regression for each country with fixed stock-level effects (using the same specification as 
in column 1 of Table III), and is based on daily data for 25 countries (all the countries in Table I, except for 
the Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Israel and Luxembourg). The table summarizes the individual 
regression estimates. Naked Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are forbidden and 
covered sales are allowed and 0 otherwise. Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if even covered 
short sales are forbidden and 0 otherwise.  
 
Constant Average  coefficient 
Number of estimates 
Number positive  
Positive and significant at 1 percent level 
Number negative 








  Average coefficient 
Number of estimates 
Number positive  
Positive and significant at 1 percent level 
Number negative 







Covered Ban  Average coefficient 
Number of estimates 
Number positive  
Positive and significant at 1 percent level 
Number negative 







Stock-Level Fixed Effects    Yes 
Total number of observations    5,143,173 
Total number of stocks    16,491   40
  
 Table VII. Bid-Ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans for Dually Listed Stocks 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread on the domestic market (in columns 1 and 3) 
or on the U.S. market (in columns 2 and 4) for dually listed stocks. Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
short sales, either naked or covered, are forbidden and 0 otherwise. The regressions in columns 1 and 2 are 
estimated with daily data for all dually listed stocks in the U.S. The regressions in columns 3 and 4 are 
estimated for the subset of stocks whose countries imposed a ban on financial stocks only.  All estimates are 
obtained with OLS, with robust estimates of the standard errors clustered at the stock level, and include fixed 
effects at the stock level. The numbers in parentheses below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. The 









U.S. Dual Listing 
Liquidity 






































Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
42,371 46,181  18,767  19,295 
Calendar  Dummies  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Number of Stocks  131  133  56  56 
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Table VIII. Price Discovery and Short-Selling Bans 
 
Column 1 of the table shows the median value of the first-order autocorrelation of residuals from a market 
model regression of weekly returns for different subsamples. Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if short 
sales, either naked or covered, are forbidden, and is 0 otherwise.  The market model regression is estimated 
with weekly returns data for all individual stocks from 30 countries from January 2008 to June 2009, using a 
national broad stock market index as the market proxy. Column 2 shows the median cross-autocorrelation 
between individual stock returns and the corresponding lagged market return, when the latter is negative, in 
each of the two subsamples, and the difference between the two. Column 3 reports the same statistics for 
positive or zero market returns. Column 4 reports the median of the difference between the downside cross-
autocorrelation and the upside cross-autocorrelation. The bottom row shows the difference between the 
medians of the two subsamples, and the numbers in parenthesis are the p-value of the K non-parametric test 

















between Stock Returns 
and Market Returns 





 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Ban = 0  0.0824  0.2833  0.2340  0.0358 
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Table IX. Stock Returns and Short-Selling Bans  
 
The dependent variable is the weekly excess return for each stock, defined as the difference between the raw 
return and the country equally-weighted market index. We drop all observations in which the raw stock return 
is zero, to avoid non-trading biases. Naked Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are 
forbidden and covered sales are allowed, and is 0 otherwise. Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if even covered short sales are forbidden, and is 0 otherwise. Disclosure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the seller has to disclose his position and 0 otherwise. The specifications in column 1 and 2 are estimated only 
on data for the U.S. and those in columns 3 and 4 are estimated with data for all the other countries with 
partial bans. The estimates in columns 1 to 3 are based on the panel data for these countries, while those in 
columns 2 and 4 are based on matched stocks using the event study methodology described in the text.  All 
regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the stock level, and include fixed 
effects at the stock level and weekly time effects. The numbers reported in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates are t-statistics. The coefficient estimates marked with three (two) asterisks are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 (5) percent level. 
 
 





































Fixed Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Weekly Fixed 
Effects  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes 
Countries in 











Panel         
data 
Event       
study 
Number of 
observations  245,631 43,973  299,980  7,695 
Number of 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































naked ban (# stocks) covered ban (# stocks) naked ban (mkt cap) covered ban (mkt cap)
 
Figure 2. World Percentage of Stocks Subject to Short-Selling Bans. The two darker histograms plot the 
market capitalization of the stocks subject to naked and covered bans, respectively, as a fraction of total 
market capitalization. The two lighter histograms plot the fraction of stocks subject to naked and covered 
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Figure 3. World Average Bid-Ask Spread and Key Events. The thin line plots daily values and the bold 
line plots the 5-day moving average of the bid-ask spread’s cross-sectional average for our sample. The letters 
in the figure mark the following events: (a) 16 March 2008: Bear Stearns distressed sale to J.P. Morgan 
Chase; (b) 11 July 2008: failure of IndyMac; (c) 15-16 September 2008: failure of Lehman Brothers and AIG 
rescue announcement; (d) 29 September 2008: rejection of the initial Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 












































































Figure 4. Average Bid-Ask Spread of Stocks Subject to Bans and of Matched Exempt Stocks for 
Countries with Partial Bans. The lines plots the 3-day moving average of the bid-ask spread’s cross-
sectional average for stocks subject to bans and control stocks (left scale) and their differential (right scale), 
in a 50-days window around the ban inception date (date 0). The data refer to countries with partial bans: 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, Austria, Portugal, U.K. and 

































Naked Covered  
 
Figure 5. Impact of Short-Selling Ban on the Percent Quoted Bid-Ask Spread, by Country. The height 







































covered ban no ban
 
Figure 6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in the U.S. for Stocks Subject to Covered Bans and for 
Exempt Stocks. The figure plots cumulative abnormal returns in the 14 trading days after ban date, which 
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Figure 7. Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Countries with Partial Bans (except the U.S.) for Stocks 
Subject to Ban and Exempt Stocks. The figure plots cumulative abnormal returns in the 60 trading days 
after ban date, which corresponds to date 0 in the graph. 
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Internet Appendix for 




This Appendix contains additional estimates and figures that are mentioned and described in our 
paper but were not reported there in order to preserve space. Specifically, the Appendix includes: 
Table A1: Panel regressions whose dependent variable is the Amihud Illiquidity measure, defined as 
the absolute value of the stock daily return divided by its trading volume on the same day. The 
specifications of the regressions in this table are the same as those shown in the first four columns 
Table III of the paper, where the dependent variable is the bid-ask spread. 
Table A2: Statistics on the Quality of the Match by Country. 
Table A3: Liquidity of Banned and Control Stocks around the Ban by Country. 
Table A4: Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans Excluding Bad Matches. 
Table A5: Cross-country regressions whose dependent variables are the country-specific estimated 
coefficients of the ban variables in the regressions from Table VI of the paper. The 18 observations 
used in the regression shown in column 1 include the estimated coefficients of the covered ban 
dummy for Italy, Netherlands and Switzerland, where also the estimate for the naked ban dummy 
would be available. This choice is dictated by the fact that in Italy and the Netherlands the covered 
ban lasted much longer than the naked one (which in the Netherlands lasted only 2 weeks), and in 
Switzerland financials were always subjected to a covered ban (and non-financials to a naked ban). 
Table A6: 2SLS panel regression of the bid-ask spread for countries that applied short-selling bans 
on financials only, where the short-selling dummy (capturing both naked and covered bans) is 
instrumented with the lagged monthly values of the average credit default swap on financials and of 
the Financial Stress Indicator. 
Table A7: Liquidity of Banned and Control Stocks around the Ban Lift, by Country. 
                                                 
* Alessandro Beber and Marco Pagano, 2011, Internet Appendix to “Short-Selling Bans around the World: 
Evidence from the 2007-09 Crisis” Journal of Finance [vol #], [pages], http://www.afajof.org/IA/2011.asp. 
Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting information 
supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the authors of the 
article.   49
Table A8: Excess Returns of Banned and Control Stocks around the Ban, by Country. 
Table A9: Stock Returns and Short-Selling Bans Excluding Bad Matches. 
Table A10: 2SLS panel regression of excess stock returns for countries that applied short-selling 
bans on financials only, where the short-selling dummy (capturing both naked and covered bans) is 
instrumented with the lagged monthly values of the average credit default swap on financials and of 
the Financial Stress Indicator. 
Table A11: Excess Returns of Banned and Control Stocks around the Ban Lift Date, by Country. 
Table A12:  Regression  of the returns on a dummy variable for short-selling bans in a 50-day 
window around the lifting of the ban.  
Figure A1: Ratio between Average Bid-Ask Spread and Bid-Ask Spread 100 Days before Ban in 
Australia, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Spain. 
Figure A2: Ratio between Average Bid-Ask Spread for Stocks With and Without Ban in Canada 
and the U.S. 
Figure A3: Ratio between Average Bid-Ask Spread for Stocks With and Without Ban in 
Switzerland and the U.K. 
Figure A4: Ratio between the Average Bid-Ask Spread of Stocks Subject to Bans and the Average 
Bid-Ask Spread of Exempt Stocks for Countries with Partial Bans. 
   50
Table A1. Amihud Illiquidity Measure and Short-Selling Bans: Regression Analysis 
The dependent variable is the percentage Amihud illiquidity measure for all 30 countries. Naked Ban is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are forbidden and covered sales are allowed and 0 
otherwise. Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if even covered short sales are forbidden and 0 
otherwise. Disclosure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the seller has to disclose his position and 0 
otherwise. Volatility is a moving standard deviation of returns based on the previous 20 observations. The 
regressions are estimated by OLS on daily data with robust standard errors clustered at the stock level  in 
columns 1, and 2, and AR(1) correction in columns 3 and 4. All regressions include fixed effects at the stock 
level. The numbers reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. The estimates 
marked with three (two) asterisks are significantly different from zero at the 1 (5) percent level.  
 

















































Volatility      0.33
*** 
(43.33) 
Stock-Level  Fixed  Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
AR(1) Disturbances  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Number of Observations  4,373,944  707,054  4,357,092  4,357,092 
Included Stocks  All  Financials  All  All 
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Table A4. Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans Excluding Bad Matches 
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread at the market close. Naked Ban is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are forbidden and covered sales are allowed, and is 0 otherwise. 
Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if even covered short sales are forbidden, and is 0 otherwise. 
Disclosure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the seller has to disclose his position and 0 otherwise. The 
regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors, matched pair-level fixed effects, and day fixed 
effects, using daily data for the 13 countries that banned short sales only for financial stocks: Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, Austria, Portugal, U.K. and U.S. The 
estimates are based on matched stocks using the event study methodology described in the text for a time-
window spanning 50-days around the ban enactment.  
Columns (2) and (3) represent sub-samples excluding pairs where the distance of the matching variables was 
large (the largest 1% or 25% for each country). Column (4) excludes from the sample the countries with 
largest mean distance measure, where presumably the matching was harder to implement. 
The numbers reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates are t-statistics. The coefficient estimates 
marked with three (two) asterisks are significantly different from zero at the 1 (5) percent level.  
 
 


































































Day Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Stock-Level Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Methodology  Event study Event 
study 
Event 
study  Event study 
Number of observations  45,588  44,945  34,330  43,941 
Number of matched pairs  783  772  588  755 
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Table A5. Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans: Country-by-Country Estimates 
 
The table reports the estimates of a cross-country regression whose dependent variables are the ban dummies’ 
coefficient obtained in the individual country regressions from Table VI in the paper. Median Size and 
Median Volatility are the country-level medians of total market value and stock return volatility in the first 6 
months of 2008. Ownership Concentration is the average percentage of common shares owned by the three 
largest shareholders in the 10 largest non-financial, privately owned domestic firms in a given country (drawn 
from La Porta et al., 1998).  
 
 
  All Countries with Ban 
(1) 





















2 0.26  0.79 
Observations 18  10   55
Table A6. Bid-ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans Applying to Financial Stocks Only:  
2SLS Estimates  
 
The dependent variable is the percentage quoted bid-ask spread at the market close. The Ban dummy variable 
equals 1 if either naked or covered short sales are forbidden, and is 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated 
with 2SLS, using daily data for the 13 countries that banned short sales only for financial stocks: Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Ireland, Norway, Austria, Portugal, U.K. and U.S. The 
Ban dummy variable is instrumented with the lagged monthly values of the average credit default swap on 
financials and of the Financial Stress Indicator. The specification includes stock-level fixed effects and day 
fixed effects: for computational reasons the estimation is implemented by replacing dependent and 
independent variables by their deviations from the respective stock-level average and including daily fixed 
effects in the regression. The number reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates is its t-statistics, 
obtained with robust standard errors. The coefficient estimates marked with three asterisks are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 percent level, using the relevant critical values (e.g., critical values for the Cragg-
Donald F-statistic are from Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
 
 




Day Fixed Effects  Yes 
Stock-Level Fixed Effects  Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-test   217.84
*** 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic   436.74
*** 
First-stage Cragg-Donald Wald F-test  280.83
*** 
Hansen J statistic (robust Sargan test)  0.67 
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Table A9. Stock Returns and Short-Selling Bans Excluding Bad Matches 
 
The dependent variable is the weekly excess return for each stock, defined as the difference between the raw 
return and the country equally-weighted market index. We drop all observations in which the raw stock return 
is zero, to avoid non-trading biases. Naked Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if naked short sales are 
forbidden and covered sales are allowed, and is 0 otherwise. Covered Ban is a dummy variable that equals 1 
if even covered short sales are forbidden, and is 0 otherwise. Disclosure is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the seller has to disclose his position and 0 otherwise.  
The specifications in columns 1, 2, and 3 are estimated only on data for the U.S. and those in columns 4, 5 
and 6 are estimated with data for all the other countries with partial bans. Columns 2, 3, 5 and 6 represent 
sub-samples excluding pairs where the distance of the matching variables was large (the largest 1% or 25% 
for each country). All estimates are based on matched stocks using the event study methodology described in 
the text.  All regressions are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors, include fixed effects at the 
matched stock-level and weekly time effects. The numbers reported in parenthesis below the coefficient 
estimates are t-statistics. The coefficient estimates marked with three (two) asterisks are significantly 
different from zero at the 1 (5) percent level. 
 























































































Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Countries in 





















677  670  506  120  109  90 
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Table A10. Stock Returns and Short-Selling Bans Applying to Financial Stocks Only:  
2SLS Estimates  
 
The dependent variable is the excess return for each stock, defined as the difference between the raw return 
and the country equally-weighted market index. The Ban dummy variable equals 1 if either naked or covered 
short sales are forbidden, and is 0 otherwise. The regression is estimated with 2SLS for the 13 countries that 
banned short sales only for financial stocks: Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, France, Netherlands, 
Ireland, Norway, Austria, Portugal, U.K. and U.S. The Ban dummy variable is instrumented with the lagged 
monthly values of the average credit default swap on financials and of the Financial Stress Indicator. The 
specification includes stock-level fixed effects and day fixed effects: for computational reasons the estimation 
is implemented by replacing dependent and independent variables by their deviations from the respective 
stock-level average and including daily fixed effects in the regression. The number reported in parenthesis 
below the coefficient estimates is its t-statistics, obtained with robust standard errors. The coefficient 
estimates marked with three asterisks are significantly different from zero at the 1 percent level, using the 
relevant critical values (e.g., critical values for the Cragg-Donald F-statistic are from Stock and Yogo, 2005). 
 
Dependent Variable: excess stock return   
Ban Instrumented Variable  0.0015 
(0.12) 
 
Day Fixed Effects  Yes 
Stock-Level Fixed Effects  Yes 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap F-test   2272.17*** 
First-stage Kleibergen-Paap LM statistic   2269.25*** 
First-stage Cragg-Donald Wald F-test  1136.09*** 
Hansen J statistic (robust Sargan test)  4.03 
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Table A12. Stock Returns and Short-Selling Ban Lifts  
 
The dependent variable is the daily excess return for each stock, defined as the difference between the raw 
return and the country equally-weighted market index. We drop all observations in which the raw stock return 
is zero, to avoid non-trading biases. Covered Ban Lift is a dummy variable that equals 1 after bans of covered 
short sales are lifted, and is 0 otherwise. The specification in column 1 is estimated with data for the U.S. 
only and that in column 2 is estimated with data for all the other countries with partial ban lifts (i.e., Canada, 
Netherlands, and United Kingdom). All estimates are based on matched stocks using the event study 
methodology described in the text, spanning a 50-days window before and after the ban lift.  Both regressions 
are estimated by OLS with robust standard errors clustered at the stock level, and include fixed effects for 
matched stock pairs and day time effects. The numbers reported in parenthesis below the coefficient estimates 
are t-statistics. The coefficient estimates marked with three asterisks are significantly different from zero at 
the 1 percent level. 
 
  (1) (2) 















































































Figure A1. Average Bid-Ask Spread over Bid-Ask Spread 100 Days before Ban  
in Australia, Italy, Japan, South Korea and Spain 























Figure A2. Ratio between Average Bid-Ask Spread for Stocks With and Without Ban  
in Canada and the U.S. 
(vertical lines: start and end of ban; thin line: daily values, bold line: 5-day moving average) 





















































Figure A3. Ratio between Average Bid-Ask Spread for Stocks With and Without Ban  
in Switzerland and the U.K. 





































Figure A4. Ratio between the Average Bid-Ask Spread of Stocks Subject to Bans and the 
Average Bid-Ask Spread of Exempt Stocks for Countries with Partial Bans. The thin line plots 
daily values and the thick line plots the 5-day moving average of this ratio. The data refer to stocks 
from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway and Portugal. 
Date 0 marks the inception date of the ban.  
 